

Working Paper

Final version published as:

“Negotiating Anglo-America: Australia, Canada and the United States,” by Louis W. Pauly and Christian Reus-Smit

Chapter 6 of: *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational identities beyond West and East*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, New York and London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 127-151.

Introduction

At the core of the Anglo-American West, what some still imagine to be the cutting edge of modernity, lay unfinished cultural conflicts and persistent practices of political accommodation. Contests over collective identities, over the extent of commitments to the autonomy of the individual, and over the standing of distinct cultures within single polities – all were hardwired into the most basic social and political processes of a still promising and still potentially global project. Larger systemic implications may be drawn from the essentially pluralist practices, including open-ended negotiation, through which unique cultures defined, defended, and integrated themselves within Anglo-America. One promising way to draw out those implications is to look comparatively at the evolution of such practices within key bilateral relationships constitutive of something that may rightly be remembered as Anglo-American civilization.

This chapter compares and contrasts US-Canada and US-Australia relations over a long period of time. Conservative politicians, scholars, and political commentators place these three states at the heart of the “Anglosphere,” attributing to them a robust cultural unity – one that is said to explain numerous political outcomes, from unparalleled levels of intelligence sharing and common assessments of diverse geopolitical challenges to remarkable economic openness and the diffusion of similar policy reforms.¹ Yet these two bilateral relationships have also been used to highlight differences, particularly in relation to specific aspects of complex interdependence in world politics. In what follows we take this emphasis on difference and variation one step further. We examine the deeper cultural and political histories of Canada and Australia, and their respective relationships with the United States, to show how processes of economic, security, and ideological linkages correlate with far-reaching internal political reconfigurations, which we contend are best captured in the concept of “complex sovereignty.” Today, changes within these two bilateral relationships combine with unique geographies and histories to place Canada and Australia at the eroding psychological boundaries around Anglo-America itself, and at the fulcrum of the emerging global civilization of modernity.

From Complex Interdependence to Complex Sovereignty

Australia and Canada are longstanding allies of the United States; prior to alliance in its current shape, both constituted essential parts of the British Empire.² Even before the United States took on the role of systemic leader and the Empire began to recede, each had sought ever deeper

integration into the American economy and into world markets eventually anchored in that economy. Each, moreover, has long professed a strong affinity with the liberal values championed by Washington. Yet these relationships, in some ways located at the cultural and geographic limits of the Anglo-American world, are marked as much by diversity as by similarity. In *Power and Interdependence*, Keohane and Nye drew a distinction between relationships characterized by complex interdependence – in which military power has become less relevant, there is no clear hierarchy of issues, and multiple channels connect societies – and those that come closer to realist expectations, in which military security dominates and social linkages are few. While the realist concept of “hegemony as dominance” applied to neither the Canada-US nor the Australia-US relationship, the former was a microcosm of complex interdependence, while in the latter “the protective role of military force has remained crucial, and distance has limited the multiple channels of contact.”³

Much has changed in the two bilateral relationships since the original publication of *Power and Interdependence* in 1977. The Australia-US relationship, in particular, subsequently developed many of the attributes that Keohane and Nye associated with the complex interdependence of Canada-US relations, suggesting a degree of convergence between the cases. While the ANZUS alliance remains central to the relationship, webs of interdependence now enmesh both societies, and no clear hierarchy of issues exists. Not only do Australia and the United States now engage across a broad spectrum of issues, from combating transnational terrorism to managing economic globalization and reducing climate change, but Australia must today balance efforts to preserve the alliance relationship with its key commitment to economic engagement with China.

Clearly, the bare architecture of complex interdependence is still apparent in both the Australian and the Canadian cases – military force is no longer central, multiple channels connect societies, and a plethora of issues compete for attention. But Keohane and Nye emphasized the “reciprocal effects among countries and among actors in different countries.”⁴ The degree to which states were affected by interdependence, positively or negatively, was determined by their relative “sensitivity” and “vulnerability,” the former referring to “how quickly changes in one country bring costly changes in another,” the latter to a state’s “liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.”⁵ The underlying model treated states as relatively stable entities responding as rational actors to the incentives and constraints of interdependence. Although useful in terms of analytical brush-clearing, such a model fails to capture much of the actual contemporary complexity of the two bilateral relationships. More than this, the continuing convergence it suggests is now misleading.

Seen over time through alternate lenses, these two relationships evince considerable diversity. To begin with, if the concept of hegemony is to play any useful analytical role, the idea of dominance that provided the backdrop to Keohane and Nye’s critique and analysis needs to be replaced by a more nuanced conception, one that integrates ideas of leadership, followership, and shared social purposes. Hegemony-as-dominance did characterize the prior relationship between the early English settlers and the earliest occupants of the two landmasses implicated, namely aboriginal peoples in both cases and French settlers in the Canadian case. The troubled legacies of that original contact can hardly be denied; they certainly underlie current debates on indigeneity and its implications in both Canada and Australia. With regard to bilateral relations with the United States since the late nineteenth century, however, even the concept of structural

hierarchy sheds little light. In fact, both Canadian and Australian elites from then on have shown inconsistent and often ambivalent attitudes toward political influence from abroad in the processes of defining their own novel senses of nationhood. In reality, both Canada and Australia have constantly renegotiated their relationships, first with the United Kingdom and then with the United States. Within frameworks characterized by increasingly diffuse hierarchies of power, these relationships have evolved to accommodate ongoing and regionally distinct reconfigurations of political authority.

The processes through which Canadians and Australians have built their polyglot nations and, in turn, been constrained by diverse geographies and cultural expectations are dynamic. The idea of “complex sovereignty” today evokes these processes, this persistent, complicated, and never-completed negotiation over legitimacy. The need for effective problem-solving and risk mitigation measures, combined with commitments to maintaining the maximum feasible degree of collective political autonomy, has by now taken policymakers in Canada and Australia to many places – some below, some alongside, and some above the analytical category of the nation state. The key observable feature of institutional adaptation and innovation in this regard is an increasingly difficult search for robust solutions to problems of collective action. It now often includes quiet acquiescence in tradeoffs among governing principles that are competing or even contradictory.⁶ In bilateral relations with the United States, such tradeoffs today suggest much more than “complex interdependence.”

Facing problems often but not always shared with their American counterparts, Canadian and Australian societies find themselves drawn more deeply into non-hierarchical and non-majoritarian modes of conflict resolution. To adopt Slaughter’s language, they are embedded in networks that facilitate bargaining.⁷ In short, their polities have lost the monopoly position to which they once aspired when it came to defining the common good of their citizens and making collectively binding decisions; they are profoundly engaged in a spatial and functional reconfiguration of public authority; and they are actively experimenting with new measures to endow that process with procedural and substantive legitimacy.⁸ Although the United States faces particular and deeply rooted problems in publicly acknowledging its own engagement in such processes, the histories of Canada and Australia have long been marked by sometimes explicit and often implicit negotiations over the meaning and content of legitimate and effective political authority in both its internal and external dimensions. Indeed, those histories reflect a persistent effort to reconstitute sovereignty-in-practice through continual, multidimensional, often opaque negotiation.

In analytical terms, complex sovereignty is every day becoming more evident within the United States, Canada, and Australia as well as within their bilateral relationships. Does an increasingly militarized series of fences around the continental United States really protect American citizens from terrorist attacks, or is the threat already deeply internalized? Do freer trade and capital flows among the United States, Canada, and Australia really depend upon formal treaty arrangements, or in practical terms has deep integration of many regulatory standards and supervisory structures already superseded conventional inter-state legal agreements? Are joint military and intelligence operations involving the three countries seriously dependent on agreements dating back to the 1940s, or are habits of communication, interoperability, and burden sharing now deeply routinized, indeed rendered quite “special” in the sense used by Bow

and Santa-Cruz when they discuss Canada-US diplomatic cultures in their chapter in this volume? The most plausible answers to such questions suggest the ebb and flow of much more than sensitivity or vulnerability interdependence. Underneath contemporary relations across the territorial borders of three still formally separate states, a more fundamental working out of a shared social and political legacy now profoundly influences the day-to-day work of political leaders, government officials, businesspeople, travelers, and even citizens staying close to home.

Globalization

Australia's and Canada's relationships with the United States have been profoundly conditioned by processes of social, economic, and security globalization. Global webs of trade, production, and finance have produced new integrative dynamics, both within the bilateral relationships and beyond. Similarly, patterns of human migration have reshaped all three polities, pushing and pulling in directions often at odds with economic pressures. Lastly, significant changes have occurred in the global security environment, with the state-centric security challenges of the Cold War replaced by a far more complex mixture of traditional and non-traditional threats. Together, these forces have driven the simultaneous reconfiguration of Australian and Canadian self-understandings and their relations with the United States. Globalization, in sum, is reconfiguring Canada and Australia as sovereign polities in ways unanticipated in early studies of interdependence.

Canada

Canada and the United States have been moving beyond interdependence for some time. Neither right-wing nor left-wing nationalists desire North American confederation, but their fears concerning just such an end-point are well grounded in Canadian history. As Cox cogently summarizes it, at the outset a competition between two visions of the future decisively shaped Canada's politics, an east-west vision and a north-south vision.⁹ Creighton's commercial empire of the St. Lawrence articulated the former; it helped to rationalize both a foundational pact between Anglophone Upper Canada and Francophone Lower Canada, and an expansionist thrust to the Pacific.¹⁰ Simultaneously, however, along with English business elites, Anglo-liberal intellectuals nurtured deep if complicated economic and cultural ties with the United States. Some, like émigré Cornell professor Goldwin Smith, even anticipated a future continental federation based on liberal principles and the idea of a wider union of Anglo-Saxon peoples.¹¹

Although party politics would be influenced from the beginning by such antitheses, with Conservatives until the 1980s supporting the east-west vision and Liberals variants of continentalism, in 1867 the fathers of Canadian Confederation consciously stopped a North American political union from emerging in the aftermath of the American Civil War – a war in which nearly 50,000 Canadians fought on the Union side. They and their successors, at least until World War II, mainly aspired to build a country mindful of a fundamental British heritage but nevertheless durably distinct from the United States.¹² The founding policy line countenanced moderate protectionism in the cause of building a coherent east-west economy, accommodation of the culture and rising political demands of French Canadians, and continuation of essentially imperial strategies with regard to aboriginal peoples. In a basic sense, from the Quebec Act of 1774, to the failed American invasion of 1775, to the Constitutional Act of 1791 that divided

Upper and Lower Canada, to the Act of Union in 1840, to the establishment of Confederation in 1867, a continuous struggle played itself out to establish a viable compromise among these three basic objectives.¹³ Indeed, after assimilationist dreams were finally abandoned, that struggle focused ever more intently on the internal work of finding a viable *modus vivendi* between two distinct European cultures and many pre-existing aboriginal cultures, and on the external work of redefining ever more nuanced differences of identity and interest with the United States.

After 1945, and after the British connection had become mainly sentimental in many sections of the country, Canadians across the internal cultural divides still aspired to a high degree of political autonomy, but also to a level of economic prosperity reasonably close to the average in the northern section of the United States. In both Quebec and the rest of Canada, leaders favored the construction and maintenance of a fairer and safer society than the one widely perceived to exist to the south. In order to achieve such objectives, the more practical-minded among them knew that the country needed a novel kind of border with the United States.

Ideally, if not always in practice, that border would restrict the inflow of many kinds of problems, mainly problems associated with poor people, with guns, and with cultural influences unwanted by the national elite. It would have to be designed, however, in such a way as not to impede the inward flow of the people, money, goods, and ideas deemed desirable by most Canadians. In addition, such a border would have to accommodate certain kinds of outflows, not just of prosperity-creating exports and investments, but also of people. Some of those people – like students, skilled workers, and “snowbirds” seeking warmer weather in the winter – might eventually return home, but others would need to find opportunities in the United States that they could not find in Canada. Certain pressures potentially disruptive of the social and political balance sought release; the right kind of border then would provide a helpful sort of safety valve. Very importantly, that ideal physical boundary would also have to be porous enough to allow Canadians to benefit from American military preparedness, and for good policy ideas and artistic creations occasionally to filter out of Canada into the right American circles. But it would have to be not so porous as to render vacuous the historical claim of Canadians to legal sovereignty over a given territory.

This unique kind of border had to have an irreducible psychological dimension, what Gwyn evoked with the phrase “nationalism without walls.”¹⁴ It might be more accurate to call it deeply contested nationalism behind a well-constructed kind of fence. We return to the culturalist debates below, but in this regard even the idea behind a “common security perimeter” currently being discussed may be taken to represent the latest attempt to reconceive and rebuild such a fence.

Despite the end of the Cold War, Canadians remained willingly within a US-led security community. In the continuing absence of their own external spy service, for example, they were reliant on extensive intelligence-sharing arrangements with the United States.¹⁵ Through the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, moreover, they deliberately integrated themselves more deeply into a continental economy. Perhaps by then, even though they retained all the trappings of independent citizenship, many, many Canadians did not really view themselves as entirely alien in the territory of United States.¹⁶ In any event, they were apparently unwilling to commit themselves

to large-scale national projects that might seriously lessen their deepening economic and social links across the border.¹⁷

Canadians continued, nevertheless, to have no formal standing in US legislative and regulatory processes. As an organized interest group, moreover, Canada had no more clout inside the US Congress than any other foreign country. But General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, Dell, Apple, and other business firms operating on both sides of the political border did have such clout, and so did the governors of border states sharing crucial interests with neighboring provinces. By the opening of the twenty-first century, many cross-border understandings had taken the bilateral relationship to new levels of complexity. At one level, economic union *within* Canada was arguably strengthened by shared prosperity, while at another level, the possibility of ultimate political dis-integration from the United States continued to recede. Where the interests of residents of border towns in Ontario ended and the interests of residents of their analogues in New York and Michigan began was less clear than ever. The concept of straightforward interdependence lying behind comparative economic and social indicators seemed quaint in such a context.

Australia

Prior to the late 1960s, it was plausible to cast the US-Australian relationship in conventional alliance terms. The wartime collapse of British power in the Asia-Pacific and Australia's embrace of the United States as its principal security guarantor were recent developments. Geostrategic competition and the use of military force in the pursuit of national ends were still prominent features of the Southeast Asian political landscape. The "China threat" was as yet undiluted by economic incentives for engagement. In this world, Keohane and Nye correctly characterized Australia's relationship with the United States as one in which military security issues dominated, and conventional state-to-state relations were uncomplicated by webs of society-to-society interaction. Since the early 1970s, however, Keohane and Nye's characterization appears less and less applicable to the relationship. Australia's ties with the United States remain both close and strong, with the leaders of both countries frequently stressing the "special" nature of the relationship, the common interests that bind them together, and the importance of their shared identities as liberal democracies. Yet the relationship, "special" as it is purported to be, has been transformed by three dimensions of globalization: economic, cultural/demographic, and security.

Over the past three decades, the centre of gravity of Australian trade has shifted from the traditional centers of Europe and the United States to Asia, with China recently emerging as Australia's largest trading partner, displacing Japan and the United States.¹⁸ Much of this has been trade in strategic commodities, binding Australia's economic fortunes to key sectors of the Chinese economy. Trade in services has grown significantly as well, however. Selling education to overseas students has become a key national industry, contributing some 19.1 billion AUD to GDP annually, with 31 per cent of outbound students returning to Asia.¹⁹ These economic trends have been matched by continued high levels of immigration, and by significant growth in immigration from Asia and Africa. Immigration from China is now the second largest component of the annual intake, only slightly behind immigration from the United Kingdom.²⁰ Meanwhile, economic globalization and changing patterns of migration have been matched by

shifts in the global security environment. Since Keohane and Nye wrote, Cold War security challenges have been replaced by issues of transnational terrorism, failed states, and new threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all of which have distinctive manifestations and expressions in Australia's primary region of concern, the Asia-Pacific. Added to this, the ambiguities associated with the conjunction of America's post-Cold War ascendancy and China's rise have generated a complex geostrategic environment deeply interconnected with the dynamics and imperatives of economic globalization.

These interconnected global processes have had a profound impact on Australia's relationship with the United States. The formal architecture of ANZUS alliance remains, as does the bipartisan rhetoric of closeness and specialness. Dense networks of military and intelligence cooperation bind the two countries, and successive Australian governments have maintained the longstanding practice of providing moral and material support for Washington's overseas interventions. Ever deeper integration with the US economy has been pursued with persistent vigor, despite equally vigorous domestic debate about the merits of particular bargains, especially concerning bilateral free trade. Yet is it not at all clear that the old characterization of Australia as "a dependent ally" adequately captures the complexity of the relationship.²¹ In 1980, Joseph Camilleri wrote that "Nearly thirty years after the establishment of the ANZUS alliance, the American connection, reflected in a wide range of formal and informal arrangements, remains the single most important factor in Australia's integration into the capitalist world economy." It would be difficult indeed to write this today.

Thirty years ago, Australian governments clung to the alliance as a solution to existential security fears bred of the Cold War. Over time, however, the connection between attachment to the alliance and actual security challenges has become increasingly attenuated. The role that the alliance plays in addressing the plethora of new security challenges that have emerged since the end of the Cold War (and the events of 11 September 2001) is either unclear or deeply contested, and as prominent commentators have observed, the alliance may well be an obstacle to Australia responding effectively to the rise of China.²² Not surprisingly, defense of the alliance has been couched less in terms of its concrete contribution to ameliorating threats, and more in terms of deeply rooted friendship, commonality of values, and the benefits of living in the orbit of a unipolar power. For Labor governments (Hawke and Keating 1983-96, and Rudd and Gillard 2007 to the present), the emphasis has been on the first two of these, with the alliance being nested within broader commitments to multilateralism and augmented forms of global governance. For the Howard conservative government (1996-2007), an argument about America's enduring primacy and the viability of war-fighting responses to transnational terrorism was alloyed to a nostalgic romanticism about Australia-US relations.²³ Oddly, the most heated subject of security debate in Australia over the last decade has been in an area almost completely disconnected from the alliance – the securitized debate about asylum seekers arriving by boat.

If changes in the security environment forced a recasting and re-legitimation of Australia's relationship with the United States, economic globalization had an equally transformative effect. Drawn by the economic dynamism of East and now South Asia, the region has become the focus of Australia's political and economic attention. At the center has been Australia's determined, if ambiguous, engagement with China. For the past decade and a half, China's rise has featured as

a persistent security concern for Australian governments, standing alongside globalization as a primary structural condition framing national policy. Yet, this concern has coexisted with a bipartisan commitment to tying Australia's economic future to the rapid development of the Chinese economy, a relationship that helped shield Australia from the worst of the global financial crisis. Australia has been positioned as a principal supplier of China's natural resource demands, with the supply of "strategic" energy and mineral resources at the centre of the relationship. In the non-resource sector, Chinese students now constitute 23 per cent of Australia's international education market. In addition to simply representing growth areas in Australian trade, the imperative of vigorous economic engagement with Asia – and China in particular – has transformed the nature of the Australian economy itself, fuelling the development of the resource and service sectors and undermining innovation in manufacturing. As a result, Australian governments have been forced to balance and hedge their relationships with Washington and Beijing, an artful dance that succeeds only so long as tensions between these two powers can be contained.

One consequence of the above processes has been a significant reconfiguration of Australian understandings and practices of sovereignty. Prior to the 1970s, Australian sovereignty was "compromised" along two relatively simple axes. First, while Australian governments vigorously asserted Australia's international legal sovereignty and equally vigorously defended Australia's territorial integrity, Australia retained constitutional ties with Britain that formally bound Australia to the British Parliament, monarch, and Privy Council (ties that ended in 1986 with the passing of the Australia Act). Second, less formally, Australian governments regularly compromised Australian decision making in military-security relations with the United States. The most notable example was in the nuclear strategic realm. While nuclear weapons have never been stationed on Australian soil, key command, control, and communication facilities were maintained at North West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar. American warships and submarines were also frequent visitors to Australian ports. In both cases, Australian governments deferred to US decision making, accepting US control over the CCC facilities and Washington's policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval vessels (a position contrary to that adopted by New Zealand).

By the 1980s, a far more complex form of sovereign reconstitution was underway. As noted above, Australia gained constitutional independence from Britain in 1986, but almost immediately ratified a series of international legal instruments that 'unbundled' its sovereignty (the 1980 ratification of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights being the notable example). Similarly, as successive Australian governments sought to enmesh Australia ever deeper within globalized economic processes, national sovereignty was renegotiated to accommodate a variety of multilateral and bilateral free trade instruments that bound Australia, not only to the United States economy but also to key Asian economies. Lastly, as Australia grappled with the political implications of a greatly diversified immigration pool, Australian governments played political football with the issue of refugees, formally excising parts of Australian territory from the immigration zone and establishing offshore detention centers in nearby small island states, effectively creating new centers of extra-territorial authority. The partial sovereignty of the early post-independence period, and the compromised sovereignty of high Cold War, have thus been replaced in recent decades by a distinctively Australian variety of complex sovereignty in which both territorial and

jurisdictional authority have been crafted to the diverse imperatives of multi-faced globalization.

Identity and Engagement

As a legal principle, sovereignty allocates power and authority in distinctive ways as it defines bounded and independent political units. Organizing political life in this way, however, requires justification. It requires discourses and practices that make its political implications appear legitimate, even natural. In the context of rapid economic and social change, the task becomes more difficult, as actual political autonomy becomes attenuated. Because the Australia-US and Canada-US relationships have always demanded the artful calibration of the junior allies' sovereignty, changes in legitimation discourses and practices adopted by Canadian and Australian elites have had a significant impact on those relationships. They have worked at two inter-connected levels: at the level of internal, corporate identity, and at the level of modes of international engagement.

Australia

Since the mid-1970s, Australia has undergone a profound shift in corporate identity, in the many ways in which Australians imagine themselves as a people and a sovereign polity. Indeed, it would be difficult to find another state – certainly an advanced Western state – that has undergone a greater revolution in self-understandings and attendant institutional structures and processes. Despite the fact that Australia was a country forged through mass migration, until this period Australia was culturally defensive, a society dominated by white Anglo Protestants. It maintained an explicitly “White Australia” immigration policy and denied its indigenous peoples full political rights and membership of the polity; Catholics met systematic, if informal, discrimination in the workforce and in their access to political power. After 1970, however, in response to a variety of factors (including actual changes in the composition of the Australian population over time and political pressure for indigenous rights), a revolution in social policy occurred.²⁴ In the mid-1960s, key elements of the White Australia policy were dismantled, opening the door to a wide range of new immigrant groups; later in that decade, Australian Aborigines gained full citizenship rights.²⁵ From the mid-1970s an explicit and vigorous policy of multiculturalism was adopted, a policy promoted most notably by the conservative Fraser Government through town hall meetings across the country. Over time, as well, the old divide between Protestants and Catholics disappeared, becoming little more than a curious historical fact most Australians would no longer recognize or identify with.

While sweeping in the scope and the depth in which they transformed Australian society, these changes have not been without ongoing challenges or contestation. Multiculturalism is now the deep norm of Australian society, a norm few politicians openly challenge, with debate confined to its meanings rather than its merits.²⁶ That indigenous peoples are, and ought to be, full rights-bearing members of the polity is also taken for granted, as is Australia's “color” blind immigration policy.

Nevertheless, a series of “culture wars” erupted, principally after 1996 under the Howard Government. Howard himself was a cultural conservative with a romantic attachment to the

Australia of the 1950s. Earlier in his career he was roundly condemned for questioning the pace of Asian immigration, and while he never explicitly sought to reverse multicultural policy, he personally preferred “multiracialism,” the idea that Australians celebrate their diverse origins while focusing on what unites them as a people. His was thus an ambivalent multiculturalism with strong assimilationist overtones, a view that rubbed up against prevailing pluralist interpretations and the complex institutional practices that had evolved to support such pluralism. Similarly, the rights of indigenous peoples had gained greater recognition, taken further with the High Court’s “Mabo” decision on land rights; but the degree to which Australians should atone for violent and discriminatory past practices became hotly contested. How the new National Museum of Australia told the story of that past became a focal point for this contest, as did the issue of a formal apology to the indigenous peoples for the practice of forcibly removing aboriginal children from their families.²⁷

It is important to note here that these debates came to the fore in a permissive environment cultivated by the Howard Government, and the extent to which they reflect deep or profound divisions within Australian society is questionable. Australia’s preferential voting system amplified the voice of the minority uncomfortable with the transformation of Australian society, providing a resource for less than scrupulous politicians to exploit. Furthermore, while the treatment of asylum seekers arriving by boat has been a focal point of such politics, it is noteworthy that the anti-refugee case has not been made in racial or ethnic terms (even if these were the underlying motives). Those seeking to turn back such refugees have made their case in the language of fairness: “the boat people are jumping the queue.” Moreover, when the Rudd Government made its highly publicized apology to the indigenous stolen generations, it received almost universal endorsement across Australian society.

These transformations in, and contestations over, Australia’s corporate identity have been paralleled by a shift in Australia’s modes of international engagement. There have been two dimensions to this shift. First, the old focus on military-security ties with the United States has been replaced by an oscillating foreign policy stance, in which Australian policy has moved between phases of strong liberal internationalism (generally, though not exclusively, under Labor governments) and a more traditional, alliance focused stance. The Fraser Government (1975-83) adopted the second of these, casting the alliance with the United States as crucial to the maintenance of a central, systemic balance of power. Under the Hawke and Keating Governments (1983-96), the alliance receded into the background, displaced by an emphasis on cultivating global order and justice through international institutional development. Howard reversed this trend, reasserting the centrality of the alliance (with a number of notable exceptions, such as its support for the International Criminal Court). The Rudd/Gillard Government has since returned to a more internationalist stance. Second, since the 1970s successive Australian governments have sought deeper engagement with Asia. This engagement has had political, economic, and cultural dimensions, but again there have been shifts in temper, an integrationist mode vying with an instrumentalist mode. The integrationist mode, most notably seen under the Hawke and Keating Governments, has cast Australia as part of Asia, a move evident in everything from projects of regional institution building (APEC for example) through to Keating’s insistence that Australia “is an Asian country.” This contrasts with the instrumentalist mode seen most prominently under the Howard Government. Howard had no sentimental attachment to Asia, but had a strong sense that Australia’s interests lay in deep

integration with the burgeoning Asian economies, particularly China. The foreign policy of the Rudd/Gillard Governments is an admixture of these two tendencies, producing at times a clumsy mode of engagement with regional powers.

While these shifts in corporate identity and international engagement have occurred in parallel, they have also been deeply interconnected. One of the great weaknesses of the literature on Australian foreign policy has been its near complete failure to recognize and explore this relationship, with the domestic and international realms treated as hermetically sealed social and political universes.²⁸ In reality, how Australian governments have sought to navigate changing global conditions has been inextricably entwined with the reconstitution of the Australian polity and its broader social and economic structures. Indeed, these two processes ought to be seen as different faces of a four-decade-long struggle to reconstitute the cultural, institutional, and economic nature of the Australian polity. Moreover, different phases of domestic transformation correlate with different phases of international engagement. Less internationalist approaches to global governance, and more instrumental approaches to engagement with Asia, map on to more conservative approaches to multiculturalism and indigenous reconciliation. Similarly, more internationalist and integrationist approaches have coincided, by and large, with more progressive and ambitious social policies. Seen from this perspective, Keating's narration of Australia as an "Asian" nation articulates with the construction of a multicultural Australia, as does Howard's sentimental re-embrace of the West's political heartland with assimilationist "multiracialism" and rejection of critical reinterpretations of the history of white colonization.

Canada

The decline of the old notion of Canada as a key element of the British Empire, and even of the more recent idea that the country represented the joint project of "two founding peoples," left Canadians after World War II with the task of reimagining the nature of their political community and the rationale for its distinctiveness in an economic and social context increasingly shaped by continentalist impulses.²⁹ The vast majority of the population remained in Ontario and Quebec, formerly Upper and Lower Canada. But just as raw political power was shifting westward and new patterns of immigration began changing the country's demographic profile, especially in big cities, the claims for justice of indigenous peoples throughout the land became ever more assertive. The task of reimagining an identity capable of sustaining the legitimacy of a separate polity within North America was, and remains, daunting. Anti-Americanism could still be a vote-getting palliative, as in the federal election of 2011 when the victorious Conservatives made much of the Liberal leader's lengthy prior residence in the United States; but no Canadian leader would try to extend such emotional reactions to actual policies designed to stop their constituents from seeking access to US private healthcare, connecting to US telecommunications systems, vacationing in Florida, or sending their children to American universities.

Still, basic structures of collective identity and individual autonomy were in motion across the bilateral relationship, even if shared traditions of liberal democracy obscured fundamental political issues. In the new environment, questions of identity and autonomy pointed to sites of tension and contestation within which that relationship was, and is, being redefined. Even pro-American leaders had now to seek new characterizations of, and rationalizations for, deeper

continental integration.

“Responsible government” came to Canada in a long process beginning with rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada in 1837, the British North America Act of 1867, and the Statute of Westminster in 1931. But the very idea would be meaningless in the absence of the concept of autonomy.³⁰ Only individuals and groups possessing some requisite degree of autonomy can make decisions for which they will themselves henceforth be held responsible in any practical sense. Embedded mainly in two distinct but conjoined communities, Canadian elites in the modern period imagined themselves to be in a position to shape the conditions of their existence to the fullest extent possible and without external interference. Over time, that original “federal” division of powers along linguistic and cultural lines was supplemented by a dispersal of power along territorial lines as population expanded in the west.³¹ Although the original Canadian constitution came home from the UK in 1982 with the assent of the descendants of New France – indeed, Francophone federalist leaders were prime movers in the process – later events developed in a manner that left Quebec’s leaders unable to affirm political support for a fully elaborated settlement.³²

The technical issues here are important in understanding the specific Canadian version of “complex sovereignty.” The British North America Act, renamed the Constitution Act 1867, was patriated and became the foundational Canadian law. In addition to the final act of patriation, provincial and federal leaders sought to address the need for an explicit charter of rights and for a constitutional amending procedure. They proposed, therefore, a *new* act – the Constitution Act 1982. The first 34 clauses contained the Charter, section 35 specified the rights of indigenous peoples, section 36 covered regional disparities and equalization (transfer) payments across provinces, and sections 37-52 contained the amending procedure and other items. Nationalists in Quebec were not opposed to the Constitution Act 1867, but the separatist government then in power in Quebec was upset by the Constitution Act 1982. Even though key concessions had been made to their cause, their stated aim was “sovereignty,” or what later evolved into the idea of a formal “sovereignty-association” with the rest of Canada. Despite the defeat of related referenda in Quebec in 1980 and 1995, and despite frustrated efforts to accommodate demands for explicit acknowledgment of Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada, the issue of Quebec’s political assent to the Constitution Act 1982 remains unsettled. So, too, are many issues related to the place of indigenous peoples within the confederation, the legacy of imperialism and failed assimilationist experiments, and subsequent differences of views on precise measures to transcend that legacy.³³

Meanwhile, economic and social integrationist pressures continue to build along a North-South axis. This has created new options for local populations looking simultaneously for new markets for their resources and production, not least in Quebec. As cooperation with the United States across a range of associated issues has deepened, the east-west pressures once binding the Canadian provinces have weakened. Continentalism is today being driven by various and coincident innovations in critical technologies, in communication and transportation systems, and in artistic and literary realms of social reimagining. Even for a cohesive group of human beings, such forces could in principle change quite profoundly perceptions of the common good and, since human beings exist as individuals-in-community, encourage basic transformations in social identity. But Canadians have never really constituted a cohesive people. Their state has

therefore always been in the business of trying to construct a common identity adequate to the task of holding itself together and preventing complete envelopment by the United States. That task has lately become more difficult.

A few phrases evoke a set of practices through which successive national governments have approached it. These practices include: preservation of the idea of “the Crown” at the core of a parliamentary democracy; respect for the rule of law and the civil rights of the individual; tolerance of social difference across a vast landmass that supporters call openness and cynics can easily depict as indifference; an instinctive urge to avoid open conflict and a willingness to make tacit compromises in the name of collective cohesion; fiscal transfers to offset regional inequalities; an often deliberate draining of emotion from public policy debates; open-ended and often opaque bargaining among organized interests; a widely shared belief that many important social problems have no near-term solutions; a commitment to economic growth; a sense of irony. Therein lies the obvious inheritance from the past, a pluralist inheritance that simultaneously reflects the traditions of British pragmatism, abiding cultural diversity, and leaders determined to maintain the maximum feasible degree of political autonomy on a continent populated mainly by citizens of the United States.

In 2011 the Conservative Party won a majority of the seats in the federal parliament. A political coalition originally organized as the Reform Party of Alberta, and expressing both western alienation from central Canada and an American-style neoconservatism, superseded the old Tories, who had been out of power since 1993. The Liberal governments that followed finally collapsed in 2006. With social-democratic and Francophone nationalist parties now taking most Quebec seats, the rising power of energy-rich Alberta combined with the rightward movement of voters in Ontario to create the conditions for a pragmatic Alberta-Ontario alliance. On offer was a looser confederation, continued continental integration, and a vague kind of multiculturalism (discussed further below). Given the relative economic decline of Ontario, the traditional champion of pan-Canadian nationalism and perennial source of fiscal transfers, the challenge of holding the country together became more complicated. No alternative strategy, however, was offered by any of the country’s main political parties.

The Shifting Limits of Anglo-Liberal Bonds

If the US-Australia and US-Canada relationships no longer strictly fit Keohane and Nye’s ideal-type, and if internal and external environments have encouraged the development of complex sovereignty and malleable identities in both Canada and Australia (albeit in different specific forms), then what holds these relationships together? One possibility, hinted at above, is that it is their common Anglo-liberal heritage. Indeed, this, as we have observed, has become an increasingly important theme of those seeking to relegitimize these relationships under conditions of profound international and domestic change.³⁴ In reality, however, the common Anglo-liberal heritage of these states is as internally contradictory as it is coherent, and its causal and behavioral implications less straightforward or well varnished. The distinctive and constantly evolving cultural identities of Australia, Canada, and the United States stand in dynamic tension with a set of dominant Anglo-liberal norms that are themselves sufficiently broad to allow very real disagreements over the nature and development of a liberal international order, and equally significant differences in the evolution of their respective liberal democratic institutions.

Canada

As politics and effective decision-making became much more complex, the Anglo identity at the core of the post-1945 US-Canada relationship became more attenuated. In truth, it was never so simple, since Canadian identity was bicultural at its start, and even that was complicated by the nature of early contact with indigenous peoples. Tenuous from the beginning was the idea that Canada was ever an entirely coherent element in the effort to establish what Bell, in his seminal assessment of nineteenth-century British imperialism, labeled a global society centered on a powerful Anglo-Saxon bond.³⁵ As the MacDonald and O'Connor chapter of this book notes in a comparison of New Zealand and Canada within Anglo-America, the existence of very significant non-Anglo ethnic groups, and their steadfast refusal to assimilate, ensured a mixed cultural foundation for future nation-building.

The French fact has long deeply influenced Canada's externally oriented policy decisions, most recently, for example, in Canada's decision to oppose the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. What is involved here is the rearticulation of an internally already complex Canadian identity. Especially in the wake of new immigration flows, the broad label now commonly used to suggest the social foundations of contemporary Canadian politics is multiculturalism. That ideology needs further unpacking in the larger continental context.

Traditional Anglo-American – not to say, imperial or hegemonic – understandings are still evident in the bilateral Canada-US relationship when it comes to security, intelligence, and many economic issues. They are, however, increasingly obscure in issue areas in which a broad commitment to maintaining distinctiveness from the United States remains. Some, for example, see the widely shared interest of Canadians in publicly funded healthcare as defining one such issue area, and upon it today rests one attempt to revive a pan-Canadian nationalist vision.

Political institutions codify and make routine the creation of a public sphere and arrangements for governing activities within it. Over time, Canadian political institutions developed ever more complex and functionally differentiated organizational structures. When most people today refer to “society,” they typically think about the populations of bounded and autonomous states. And the ideological foundation of most bounded states is nationalism, whether manifested in civic or ethnic forms. The evolving Canadian polity, from its beginning to its present, rests uneasily on both forms.

Anglo-Canadians traditionally considered their collective sentiments liberal or civic, not ethnic, a preference rendered ever more plausible over time with the deliberate admixture to their society of immigrants from all over the world. In the Ontario heartland, the very word “nationalism” applied to itself seems as alien as the word “imperialist” sometimes applied to it by Quebecers or by indigenous peoples. In contrast, notwithstanding demographic pressures associated with low birth rates and significant immigration flows, old stock Quebecers remain in control of their province and continue to assert the legitimacy of that control, sometimes subtly and sometimes not so subtly, on a distinct ethnic claim.

Indeed, since the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759, the central political struggle for

Canadians as a collectivity has been to find a way to accommodate the deep cultural distinctiveness of the descendants of New France. The two-founding-nations thesis and confederalism eventually provided a kind of answer. Until the late 1960s, various iterations of the British-derived discourses and pragmatic practices noted above sought to keep ethnic nationalism within Quebec contained. With the unexpected rise of Pierre Trudeau to the federal prime ministership in 1968, however, a radical reversal occurred as Parliament united around a strategy of “confronting and undermining Quebec nationalism.”³⁶ This son of a Scottish mother and French Canadian father committed himself to bringing Quebecers out of ethnic, hierarchical, and territorial mindsets. He wanted them to see all of Canada as their own.

In 1971, reinterpreting a key recommendation from the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Trudeau finally articulated a policy toward which he had been moving all of his adult life – the embrace of bilingualism from sea-to-sea-to-sea combined with a decisive rejection of biculturalism, which in his view was narrowly collectivist, unjustifiably historicist, and unnecessarily restrictive. The policy came to be labeled “multiculturalism.” As Trudeau originally put it in Parliament: “... although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other.”³⁷ Leaving aside the debate between those who wanted to imagine the fire of 1759 still burning or to reinforce the later image of “two founding peoples,” Trudeau asserted that “the individual’s freedom would be hampered if he were locked for life within a particular cultural compartment by the accident of birth or language.”³⁸

[In sum,] a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all.³⁹

The argument over the success or failure of Trudeau’s policy continues, not least in referenda on the question of Quebec separation in 1980 and 1995, in subsequent failed efforts to amend the federal Constitution through a formula acceptable to Quebec, and in the rising assertiveness of aboriginal groups. Recently expanding immigration from the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, moreover, changed the context for policy debate, partly by highlighting race in a country that had long sought to insulate itself from deeply racialized social problems in the United States.⁴⁰ Robert Cox captured well the optimistic multiculturalist vision of the country’s future: “A coexistence of cultures, not by assimilation to one standard model, but for the mutual enjoyment of diversity, is the emerging form of the pan-Canadian idea; this is the domestic counterpart to the geopolitical evolution of a plural world.”⁴¹ Nationalist Quebecers, on the other hand, saw the matter differently. It undercut their identity as a people with prior and irrevocable claims on power within a given territory, and it threatened to reduce them to the assimilated status of other French-speaking populations in the Anglo sea of North America. Although their fears failed to culminate in outright secession from the rest of Canada, separatist leaders from

Trudeau's time to the present could count on near-majority support. They could also count on a reluctance from the rest of Canada to push Trudeau's project aggressively. As Ignatieff put it, "Since the 1995 referendum ... the fervent desire to find either common ground or the terms of divorce has been replaced by a tacit contract of mutual indifference."⁴²

To leading Quebec intellectuals, that indifference represents contemporary acquiescence by the rest of Canada to what some call "interculturalism." Rejecting multiculturalism as an attempt to deny Quebec a heritage that preceded the arrival of English-speakers, but also seeking to move beyond a simplistic and outmoded biculturalist vision of Quebec and Canada, in 2008 two prominent scholars from either side of Quebec's language divide, Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, proposed interculturalism as a viable alternative to Trudeau's vision. In a report commissioned by the Government of Quebec, they characterized their central idea as at least applying in Quebec in such a manner as to: a) institute French as the common language of intercultural relations; b) cultivate a pluralistic orientation that is concerned with the protection of rights; c) preserve the necessary creative tension between diversity, on the one hand, and the continuity of the French-speaking core and the social link, on the other hand; d) place special emphasis on integration and participation; and e) advocate interaction. The main implication they drew for policy was the need for "reasonable accommodation" of the desires of non-dominant groups in Quebec, now including many new immigrants, as long as such accommodation did not undercut "the continuity of the French-speaking core" or broader social cohesion.⁴³

The debate remains unfinished, and contemporary Canadian society in fact remains influenced by biculturalist, interculturalist, and multiculturalist ideas. Ethnic nationalism in Quebec has not been decisively overcome, and Canada as a whole is hardly bilingual. At the same time, the economic opportunities spawned by deeper continental integration have nurtured visions in Quebec of sovereignty-association in practice if not in law. In this light, Anglophone Canada and Francophone Canada remain caught up in a supreme irony, for Trudeau's foundational anti-nationalism provided a key building block for a new and more complex kind of nationalism. As Forbes explains:

[S]een from the perspective of its founder, [multiculturalism is] an experiment in creating a nation designed to show the world how to overcome nationalism and war. The confusing difficulty Trudeau faced was the need to foster a certain nationalism in the very act of trying to overcome it. Given the prevailing national organization of political life, any appeal to Canadians to embark on the experiment he favoured had to be cast as an appeal to their national pride and ambition.⁴⁴

An uneasy federal union continues to rest on contested and diverse nationalist ideologies, but also on persistent and pragmatic practices of cross-cultural negotiation.⁴⁵ Charles Taylor himself many years ago diagnosed this as fundamentally representing a tense but persistent conversation between two incompatible views of liberal society, one based on proceduralism and the fundamental rights of individuals, the other respecting such rights within an overarching framework that accommodates the enduring identity of a distinctive and dominant group within a given territory.⁴⁶

Beyond the perennial issue of reaching a final understanding between English and French-

speaking Canadians on the nature of their union, another incomplete conversation involving contradictory premises and much hypocrisy today centers on indigenous peoples, or “first nations.” Debate on the actual political and cultural status of indigeneity is gathering force, having long been suppressed, most recently under the rubric of multiculturalism. Indigenous peoples in Canada received the right to vote only in 1960, but many would later come to see a fuller set of rights as grounded in claims to dignity and self-government pre-dating the establishment of Canada – or Anglo-America. In 2010 the Canadian federal government ratified the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and seemed to accept that fundamental point. What this actually means for contemporary political practice, in policy arenas under federal and especially provincial jurisdiction, remains to be seen.

Pragmatic practices for governing a society fundamentally marked by such abiding cultural differences undoubtedly provide distinct groups, and sometimes Canada as a whole, with useful tools for extracting benefits from economic and social integration across the North American continent. Surely helping to render such an outcome politically acceptable to the United States is the observation that the actual process of managing Canada’s cultural struggles correlates with policies favoring a high degree of economic openness. Providing Americans with ever-expanding access to vast natural resources certainly helps Canadians counter an ancient external threat to their political integrity. The internal challenge remains.

Australia

Unlike in the Canadian case, where claims to common Anglo roots are complicated by the culturally divided nature of Canadian society, both the United States and Australia grew out of dominant British settler societies, English has remained their predominant language, and their societies have been culturally diversified by waves of post-1945 immigration. Similarly, both states embrace their identities as liberal democracies, maintain (with several notable lapses) robust democratic institutions, and remain committed to the preservation and development of a liberal international order.

The picture with respect to Australia is considerably more complicated, however. Australian democracy was not the product of revolutionary struggle – Australians gained their independence, as well as their democratic institutions, incrementally and with more than a little ambivalence and anxiety. If John Stuart Mill was correct that a people must struggle for their liberties if they are to understand and appreciate them, the absence of struggle has left Australians with neither a strong sense of ownership of their democratic institutions nor deep identification with their democratic rights. Fortunately, aspects of the Australian Constitution, such as compulsory and preferential voting, foster robust democratic practices. But the Constitution provides no explicit guarantees of individual rights, it falling to High Court to identify a number of “implied rights.” (This is clearly apparent in the Victorian state government’s recent ban on swearing in public). The policy and practice of multiculturalism is constructed on liberal norms of toleration and pluralism, but this domain of social policy has, if anything, been a vehicle for the articulation and diffusion of such norms, rather than a product of them. Current government statements about what Australian multiculturalism means state that what binds Australians of diverse cultural backgrounds together is respect for Australia’s democracy and laws, and the rights and liberties of all individuals.⁴⁷ The nature and existence of

such rights and liberties is generally not a matter of public discourse or debate: Australian liberalism lives in the realm of habitual practices, not self-conscious values, resulting in a notable (and laudable) general absence of preaching about political values. On the downside, it is hard to stir Australians in defense of fundamental liberties, as evident in the near total lack of public concern about elements of recent anti-terrorist legislation and the torture of Australian citizens in the conduct of the war on terror.

In addition to the distinctive nature of its liberal democracy, Australia's engagement with the Anglo world has, since the Second World War, worked in moving concentric circles. After 1945, despite the shift in Australia's military-strategic dependence toward the United States, its closest ties were with Britain, reinforced by the persistence of imperial structures for the next two decades. During this period, the United States was the ally of necessity, but in terms of Anglo attachments it was one step removed from Britain. The complexities of these Anglo attachments were clearly apparent in the politics of post-war decolonization, where Australia often equated Anglo bonds with imperial bonds and found itself in an ambiguous relationship with the United States as Washington's position on decolonization oscillated between rhetorical support for colonial peoples and practical opposition to the self-determination movement in the United Nations. Since the mid-1970s – with the multicultural transformations of Australian society and identity and greater engagement with Asia – the romantic attachment of Australian elites to the Anglo world, so evident in Menzies era, has declined. While Howard's personal expressions of Australia's relations with the US echo such romanticism, justifications for close ties have appealed either to strategic imperatives or to a history of friendship and common endeavor. As suggested earlier, the increased appeal to the latter kind of legitimation has coincided with the end of the Cold War and the decline in established justifications for the alliance relationship. Ever more frequent references to common liberal democratic traditions and values have accompanied this shift.

The rhetoric of shared liberal-democratic identity, and the implication that this can inform shared foreign policy positions, is belied by the fact that liberal democracy can have multiple meanings and multiple institutional expressions, as can a "liberal international order" constructed and sustained by liberal democratic states. The relationship among the individual, society, and the state is central to liberalism, but there is no consensus among liberal democrats about what this means in concrete institutional terms, and "real existing" liberal democracies exhibit considerable political cultural and institutional variation (as evident in the differences between Australia and the United States). Similarly, the rights of the individual, a commitment to multilateralism and international law, and peace through free trade are emblematic liberal internationalist values. Yet how this translates into concrete policies and practices is open to considerable disagreement among liberal states. If mutual respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality undergirds a multilateral order and the rule of international law, can this be compromised to protect individual rights, for example? These inherent contradictions within the ideational complex of liberal internationalism have produced substantial policy divergence between Australia and the United States since the early 1980s, with the two states moving in and out of step with one another, particularly on key issues of global institutional development. While a baseline commitment to supporting the United States is a persistent feature of Australian foreign policy, a clear pattern has developed of Australian Labor governments (Hawke and Keating, then Rudd and Gillard) pursuing ambitious programs of international institutional

development well ahead of Washington's consistent institutional ambivalence.⁴⁸ There have also been a number of key differences under conservative governments, the Howard Government's strong support for the International Criminal Court being the most notable example.

What, therefore, binds the US-Australia relationship together? If the geostrategic necessities of Cold War have gone, if economic engagement with China is pulling Australia in new directions, if discourses of friendship, specialness, and liberal-democratic brotherhood have come to the fore in the context of weakening traditional bonds, then what undergirds the relationship?

Conventional arguments hold that new security challenges have replaced the old ones, giving new life to the alliance. They also emphasize the military-technological and intelligence benefits that Australia gains from close, trusted relations with Washington. And, finally, these narrowly instrumental factors are often linked to arguments about the importance of common Anglo-American bonds.⁴⁹ Yet these things seem insufficient, and need augmenting with at least two other factors. The first has to do with recognition. For Australian political leaders, as well as senior bureaucrats, the close relationship with the United States has provided social recognition of Australia's identity and standing internationally. Indeed, it may well be that the pursuit of social recognition accounts for much of the emotion that appears to characterize Australia's discursive engagement with the United States. Second, the US-Australia relationship is now deeply institutionalized, and has become embedded in habitual practices. Like all institutions, even when they prove less than optimal on purely functional grounds, the costs of change can outweigh the benefits; without a catalytic crisis forcing change (the way the fall of Singapore prompted the turn from Britain toward the United States), institutionalized relationships can persist, with incremental evolution taking the place of revolutionary change.

Conclusion

It is tempting to see the network of relations between the United States and Canada, and the United States and Australia, as demarcating the contemporary political core of the Anglo-American "West." Yet as the case histories surveyed in this chapter suggest, the actual legacy of Anglo-America is complex and fluid. In their pioneering work, Keohane and Nye tried to capture some of this complexity. Their distinctions between relations characterized by traditional power and security dynamics and those marked by deep interdependence nevertheless cannot adequately capture the enduring impact of the practices through which that legacy has been transmitted over time.

Canada and Australia have, over the past half century and in explicit or implicit dialogue with the United States, struggled to reconstitute their sovereign identities through quite distinctive discourses and policy practices. The Anglo heritage, always contested, remains – but in forms much attenuated. The term "complex sovereignty" suggests the variegated nature of those discourses and practices, which by now have themselves globalized. Although similarities continue to exist across the Canada-US and Australia-US relationships, both have faced different imperatives and adjusted in unique ways. The contrasting imperatives posed by distance and proximity are clear: Canada is navigating the complexities of physical closeness; Australia those of regional dislocation from the United States. Yet contrasts also exist in areas of seeming convergence, the politics surrounding multiculturalism providing the most prominent example. If multiculturalism is understood as more than a synonym for culturally diverse – as a distinctive

kind of public policy practice – then Canada and Australia are among the very few states to have adopted such practices, systematically and persistently. Their multicultural policies and practices are very different, however, for they arise out of different social conditions and address different challenges. Canadian multiculturalism was a response to the fact of biculturalism and bilingualism, a still-incomplete attempt to incorporate Quebecers within a culturally pluralistic polity. Australian multiculturalism took inspiration from the Canadian experiment, but in response to a very different set of imperatives. With the demise of the White Australia policy, a new policy regime was required simultaneously to provide a new narrative about Australian society and to set in place an array of practices acknowledging the increasingly diverse immigrant base of Australian society while fostering the development of a peaceful pluralism. But because of Australia's weakly developed sense of substantive national identity, this has mainly become a multiculturalism of the market place, where government sets in place policies and practices enabling cultural diversity with no mandated sense of "commonness." (The Gillard government's talk of shared rights and values is, as noted, a recent innovation.) In short, these contrasting forms of multiculturalism lie at the heart of Canada's and Australia's very different expressions of complex sovereignty.

In describing civilizations, the intellectual historian William Goetzmann writes:

They are syncretistic, chaotic, and often confusing information mechanisms. ... Civilization advances beyond the set prescriptions of culture into a broader eclecticism, and to identify both the individual and the social is harder to discern. ... Beneath the surface of apparent chaos and contradiction lies great efficiency in absorbing, organizing, and distributing the world's information. ... Cultures and systems of idea are then, figuratively speaking, temporary bulwarks, stopping places, organizational makeshifts in the path of on-rushing civilizations that are the inevitable products of history in the same sense that learning is the inevitable product of individual experience.⁵⁰

Canada-US and Australia-US relations remain embedded within something like what Goetzmann describes as a civilization. Nevertheless, our analysis casts doubt on his notion of cultures as "temporary bulwarks" eventually to be swept away by larger forces. It also suggests remarkable fluidity within and around the traditional core of Anglo-America. Even as the pressures of globalization now most clearly associated with the United States increase, the distinctive cultural and political identities within Canada and Australia continue to adapt and not to disappear. Idealists and economists remain convinced that they will ultimately be hollowed out. Our comparative overview casts doubt on any such expectation, even as it highlights successful means of taking some of the political sting out of cultural diversity. Those distinctive identities underpin commitments to political autonomy, commitments that continue to influence the scope of bilateral relations with the United States.

Complex sovereignty remains an apt descriptor of the overall situation. In Australia, expanding economic, political, and cultural engagement with Asia, and the associated and continuing transformation of Australian society through waves of non-Western immigration, have produced a collective identity in constant flux and renegotiation. This is entwined with an unresolved search for a stable liberal social identity within the international system, and particularly within the Asia-Pacific region. These processes of self-constitution draw in part on the cultural heritage

of Anglo-America but take place in the liminal space between this civilizational complex and the wider global social and cultural processes in which Australia is embedded. Similarly, Canada relies on the practical legacies of Anglo-liberalism to manage its domestic contradictions and to influence the nature and meaning of its territorial border with the United States. Even as power shifts within its confederal political system, open-ended cultural negotiation and distinctive internal compromises continue to condition the process of economic and social integration with the United States and the broader engagement of Canadians internationally.

Over the long sweep of modern history, Canada and Australia have often proven themselves to be less sensitive and less vulnerable to developments within the United States than to their own internal cultural dynamics. The discourses and policy practices through which they have held their distinctive polities together remain visible to all with eyes to see them. As the world's leaders seek practicable ways to protect common goods and address common challenges in an era when systemic power seems to be dispersing, an awareness of such practices and their enduring rationales may be instructive. Cultural distinctiveness and commitments to political autonomy place limits on deep integration, even among the inheritors of Anglo-American legacies. But the idea of complex sovereignty they embodied, and the practices they developed to sustain it, can provide an excellent starting point for thinking through pragmatic policy responses to the challenges humanity now faces at the global level. Immobilism remains an imaginable outcome, but our brief case histories suggest that cultural diversity and joint problem solving can go together. The politics of complex sovereignty remain as open and open-ended as the psychological boundaries around and within polities still shaped by the memory of Anglo-America.

Notes

¹ Wesley 2010.

² Blaxland 2006.

³ Keohane and Nye 1977, 166.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁶ Grande and Pauly 2005, 5. The underlying idea derives from convergent political and legal research literatures that evolved rapidly if mainly separately during the 1990s. The term “complex sovereignty” or its equivalents were used, for example, in works like Ruggie 1993; Biersteker and Weber 1996; and Jayasuriya 1999. On related institutional manifestations, see Katzenstein 2005 and Coleman and Pauly 2008.

⁷ Slaughter 2004.

⁸ Grande and Pauly 2005, 15.

⁹ Cox 2005, 667-84.

¹⁰ Creighton 1937.

¹¹ Cox 2005, 668.

¹² This section draws on Pauly 2003, 90-109.

¹³ Bothwell 1998.

¹⁴ Gwyn 1997.

¹⁵ Known as the “Quinquartite Partnership,” this longstanding arrangement for extensive intelligence sharing includes the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It parallels similar arrangements setting out shared doctrine for interoperability across the air, space, and naval services of the same five countries, and the continuing Quinquartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference.

¹⁶ Granatstein 1999. Note that dual nationality has long been accepted in Canada, not least because of the long and gradual process of political separation from Great Britain.

¹⁷ On the policy debate, see Canadian International Council 2010.

¹⁸ Government of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010.

¹⁹ Government of Australia, Australian Education International 2011.

²⁰ Government of Australia, Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010.

²¹ See Bell 1988 and Camilleri 1987.

²² White 2010.

²³ Garran 2004.

²⁴ The best account of this transformation is Tavan 2005. For a contrasting viewpoint, see Windschuttle 2004.

²⁵ On the incremental nature of the dismantling of the White Australia policy, and on the broad public support for the policy, see Tavan 2004.

²⁶ The importance of the latter policy has been recently reaffirmed by the Gillard government. Government of Australia, Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2011.

²⁷ See MacIntyre and Clark 2003. A very similar story played out in Canada around the same time.

²⁸ A significant exception to this tendency is Lowe 1999.

²⁹ See Clarkson 2002 and 2008; Bow 2009; Lennox 2009; Griffiths 2009.

³⁰ This section draws on Coleman, Pauly, and Brydon 2008, 1-20.

³¹ Russell 2004.

- ³² Smith 2010.
- ³³ For clarity on this subject, we are indebted to William Coleman.
- ³⁴ A good example is found in a book published by the current leader of the Australian opposition, Tony Abbott. See Abbott 2009.
- ³⁵ Bell 2007.
- ³⁶ McRoberts 1991, 55.
- ³⁷ Parliament of Canada, 8 October 1971, 8545.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ See the Vucetic and Klotz chapters in this book.
- ⁴¹ Cox 2005, 680.
- ⁴² Ibid., 154.
- ⁴³ Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 121.
- ⁴⁴ Forbes 2007, 41.
- ⁴⁵ See Simeon 2006; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007; Kymlicka 1996; and Taylor 1992 and 2004.
- ⁴⁶ Taylor 1993, 176-7.
- ⁴⁷ See Government of Australia, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010, 6.
- ⁴⁸ See Evans 1991.
- ⁴⁹ For one integration of these kinds of arguments, see Tow and Albinski 2002.
- ⁵⁰ Goetzmann 2009, xiii.